This paper examines the e¤ ects of Oportunidades, a conditional cash transfer program, on the allocation of time of household members in rural Mexico. I exploit the random placement of bene…ts across communities in the evaluation sample and the program's eligibility criteria and scheme of incentives to identify e¤ ects. The majority of Oportunidades bene…ts are linked to children's school attendance, implying a reduction in the price of schooling. I argue that changes in relative prices lead to substitution e¤ ects whereas the (almost) unconditional nutritional transfer translates into an income e¤ ect. Findings show increases in schooling and reductions in children's participation in market and nonmarket work. Although the program does not seem to substantially alter adults'time allocation, evidence suggests that adult women substitute for children's time in nonremunerated activities.
Introduction
Time is both a fundamental and a scarce resource in the economy. The study of the role of time in labor economics and the use of time budget data to model microeconomic behavior have developed since Becker (1965) seminal piece. It is nowadays widely acknowledged that time availability -or scarcity -and its allocation to various activities can ultimately determine the relative prices of goods and services, total production levels, and the distribution of income (Juster and Sta¤ord 1991) . However, the many methodological issues involved in the measurement and treatment of time data have somehow limited the amount of applied research in the area. Notable exceptions are the works by Gronau (1977) , Evenson (1978) , Mueller (1984) , Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) , Skou…as (1993) and Parker and Skou…as (2000) . Ellis (1994) provides a review of descriptive studies on time allocation in agricultural households in developing countries.
Within a household, family members devote time to many di¤erent activities: participation in the labor force, household chores, studying, or "pure" leisure activities, like hobbies or personal needs and care (sleeping, eating, etc.). 1 Moreover, the marginal rate of substitution of time allocated to each of these activities between di¤erent household members is likely to be a¤ected by certain government policies, such as work taxation, education stipends or child care subsidies. 2 If available, detailed individual data on time use provides a unique research resource to examine the impacts of public policies on individual behavior, both inside and outside the household. This paper uses cross-sectional data on time allocation for all household members (older than 8 years old) to examine intrahousehold time responses to one such policy in rural Mexico. In 1997, the Mexican Federal Government launched the Education, Health and Nutrition Program, Progresa, renamed Oportunidades under the Fox Administration. This antipoverty strategy provides monetary and in-kind bene…ts to targeted poor households conditional upon preventive care and school attendance. The poor rural communities where the program operates are tra- 1 Gronau (1977) …rst distinguished between leisure and work at home in theoretical models, while acknowledging that the distinction is not straightforward. For example, eating and sleeping could be alternatively considered an input in the household production function because they increase productivity. 2 The impact of a particular policy on intrahousehold time allocation depends on the household decision-making model assumed. Behrman (1997) and Bergstrom (1997) provide excellent reviews of the existing theories.
ditionally characterized by very high labor force participation rates of men compared to those of women. In addition, children -typically boys -tend to begin their labor force participation at early ages in order to contribute to family income.
Oportunidades aims to increase basic education school enrollment and reduce child labor by linking part of the bene…t to school attendance. This implies a reduction in the shadow wage of children's time allocated to activities other than schooling, and amongst other household members -i.e. a change in relative prices. As a result, own-substitution and cross-substitution e¤ects are likely to arise. For example, and assuming that school and work are substitutes, one would expect increases in school participation and reductions in children's time allocated to market and nonmarket work. Moreover, a reallocation of adult household members'time to market and nonmarket activities previously done by eligible children in the household are also expected. The rest of the bene…t is an (almost) unconditional …xed amount that all treatment households receive to spend on improved nutrition. This translates into an expansion of the household's budget set, and hence is likely to lead to a reduction in the labor supply of household members through the income e¤ect.
The objective of this paper is to decompose any changes in the time allocation of household members as a result of the program into income, own-substitution, and cross-substitution 
The Rural Oportunidades Program
Oportunidades is an antipoverty program that combines a traditional cash transfer approach with …nancial incentives for positive behavior in health, education and nutrition. Over its …rst three years, the program extended bene…ts to almost all eligible families living in rural areas.
Starting in 2001, it expanded to urban areas and currently covers around 5 million families all over Mexico. It is one of the largest conditional cash transfers program in the world, distributing approximately 3 billion US dollars to some 5 million bene…ciary households in 2008. 3 
Bene…t Structure
The cash transfers are disbursed bimonthly in two forms. The …rst is a …xed nutritional grant intended for families to spend on more and better nutrition. It is complemented with nutritional supplements and immunization directed to 0 to 2 year olds, and to pregnant and lactating women.
Children 2 to 5 also receive nutritional supplementation if signs of malnutrition are detected.
Families must complete a schedule of visits to health care centers and follow monthly talks on disease prevention, nutrition and health -called "pláticas" -to receive the nutritional stipend.
3 http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/informacion_general/main.html
The second is an educational grant given for each child younger than 18 and enrolled in school between the third grade of primary school and the third grade (last) of junior high. 4 It rises as children progress to higher grades in order to re ‡ect their monetary contribution to family income if they were working. In particular, the transfer amount increases substantially after graduation from primary school and is higher for girls than boys during junior high and high school to try to reduce dropout during the transition year. Bene…ciary children also receive money for school supplies once or twice a year. Students lose their bene…ciary status if they miss school more than 15 percent of the time for unjusti…ed reasons or if they repeat a grade twice.
There is an upper limit in the total transfer amount received per household. Whenever this cap is hit, the educational monthly grants are proportionally reduced so that the total household transfer amount equals the maximum. Table 1 contains the monetary values of the transfers in October 1997 pesos (baseline). The cash transfer is directly given to the female head of the household for two reasons: …rst, because Oportunidades seeks to promote gender equality; and second, because it is believed that resources controlled by women are more likely to be translated into greater improvements in children's wellbeing than resources controlled by men. On average, the total transfer received represents over 20 percent of total household income.
Bene…ciary Eligibility and Enrollment
When Oportunidades was …rst rolled out in rural areas in 1997, program eligibility was determined in two stages . First, underserved communities were identi…ed based on the proportion of households living in poverty as de…ned in the 1995 population census.
Second, low-income households in these communities were chosen using a proxy means test.
Pre-intervention (baseline) data to construct the index was collected in October 1997 on all households in eligible communities through the Survey of Household Socioeconomic Characteristics (Encuesta Socioeconómica de Hogares, or ENCASEH). This classi…cation scheme designated 52 percent of households in selected communities as eligible for bene…ts ("poor"). Subsequently, the Government decided that a subset of the "non-poor" households had been unduly excluded.
They expanded the eligibility criteria to include a set of slightly wealthier households in a process 4 Beginning in 2001, high school scholarships are granted to all bene…ciaries younger than 21 enrolled in school.
called "densi…cation". However, many of these households were not incorporated into the program until later because of administrative delays and operational di¢ culties (Hoddinott and Skou…as 2004 ).
All eligible households living in treatment localities were o¤ered Oportunidades and over 90 percent enrolled. Once enrolled, households received bene…ts for a three-year period with the possibility of being recerti…ed if all household members obtained the prescribed preventive medical care, children attended school and mothers participated in the "pláticas". About 1 percent of the households were denied the cash transfer for non-compliance. New households were not able to enroll until the next certi…cation period, which prevented migration into treatment communities for Oportunidades bene…ts. Households in rural areas were "recerti…ed" (reassessed with a proxy means test) after three years on the program to determine future eligibility. If a household was recerti…ed as eligible, it would continue receiving bene…ts. If not recerti…ed, the household was guaranteed six more years of support before transiting o¤ the program. Thus, households could expect a minimum of nine years of bene…ts upon enrollment (OPORTUNIDADES 2003).
Experimental Design and Data Sources
A remarkable aspect of Oportunidades was the commitment of the Government to conduct a rigorous evaluation. Given budgetary and logistical constraints, the Government could not enroll all eligible families in the country simultaneously and had to phase in enrollment over time. For ease of implementation, the Government decided that whole communities would be enrolled at a time and that they would be enrolled as fast as possible so that no eligible household would be kept out of the program.
As part of this process, the Government randomly chose 506 experimental communities in seven states in rural Mexico over which it randomly phased in treatment: 320 communities (60 percent) were then randomly allocated to the treatment group, and the remaining 186 communities (40 percent) to the control group. Eligible households in treatment communities began receiving bene…ts in March/April of 1998; whereas eligible households in control communities
were not incorporated until November/December of 1999. In order to minimize anticipation e¤ects, households in control communities were not informed that Oportunidades would provide bene…ts to them until two months before incorporation. Behrman and Todd (1999) 
where C is total (aggregate) household consumption and L i is the leisure time of individual i, X represents observable heterogeneity (including individual, household and community characteristics) and " represents unobservable household heterogeneity. Each household member is 5 A child is eligible for bene…ts if she: (i) lives in a poor family; (ii) has completed between second and eight grade of basic education; and (iii) is younger than 18. Any eligible child e¤ectively receives bene…ts if she: (i) lives in a treatment community; and (ii) is enrolled in grades 3 to 9 of basic education and attends school.
endowed with a total amount of time T that she can allocate between leisure and j = 1; :::; J di¤erent activities: market work (m), farm work (f ) and domestic work (d). Children can additionally engage in schooling (s). The household faces the following budget constraint:
where H j i are the number of hours individual i spends on activity j and W j i is i's marginal return to activity j 6 = s. 6 The price of schooling, W s i , equals the real cost of schooling: fees, books, transportation, etc. P is the price of the aggregate commodity good and Y is nonlabor income. The I time constraints are:
and the I J non-negativity constraints are:
After replacing the I time constraints in (1), the household optimization problem boils down to choosing the hours each family member supplies to each of the J activities and total family consumption C that maximize (1) under (2) and (4) . Assuming that the second order conditions for a maximum are satis…ed, the I J …rst order conditions: H 
6 This amounts to assuming that household members have di¤erent productivities in the performance of a given activity, and hence allows for specialization according to comparative advantages. This assumption is supported by the data: indeed, (statistically signi…cant) di¤erent wages are reported at the community level for male, female and children for di¤erent types of activities.
All standard consumer theory results hold under this framework. However, two substitution e¤ects should be now considered: (i) the substitution e¤ect given the variation in a family member's (shadow) wage on its own labor supply, the own-substitution e¤ ect; and (ii) the income-compensated e¤ect of such wage variation on any other family member's labor supply, the cross-substitution e¤ ect.
In this stylized household, the Oportunidades intervention amounts to:
1. a reduction in the price of schooling given the educational grant, t k > 0; received by each child k eligible for bene…ts and conditional on him attending school: dW s k = t k < 0, where d denotes variation.
2. an increase in nonlabor income given the (almost) unconditional nutritional grant n: dY = n > 0. 7 Therefore, for each household member i in a treatment household, the e¤ect of the Oportunidades package ( P k dW s k ; dY ) on her time supplied to activity j is:
Using the Slutsky equation, the program's total e¤ect on H j i can be re-written as:
where b H j i = b H j i (W; P; U ; X; ") is the Hicksian (utility compensated) labor supply function. 8 The …rst term in equation (9) is the own-substitution e¤ect on i = k's time spent on activity j from receiving the educational grant. By de…nition, this term will be nonzero for eligible 7 It is not completely accurate to state that the nutritional supplement is unconditional. Mothers have to perform a certain number of activities -namely, attend "pláticas" and take the children to health centers -which are time consuming and therefore might change behavior through substitution e¤ects of a nature similar to those generated by the educational grant. However, the time commitments for the mothers are much smaller than those implied by the educational grant for the children and can arguably be ignored. 8 This expression assumes that Oportunidades has no e¤ect on local prices or wages (dP = dW communities. The theoretical model also ignores any community spillover e¤ects. This simplifying assumption will be relaxed in the empirical part, which will allow for correlations across households in the same community. children k living in treatment households and e¤ectively receiving the educational grant; and zero otherwise. The second term is the sum of all cross-substitution e¤ects on H j i given the educational grants received by the (other) k children in a treatment household -i.e. the (other) children in a treatment household that receive the educational stipend. Hence, cross-substitution e¤ects will arise for any individual i (or k) living in treatment households where there are (other) bene…ciary children. The third term in equation (9) is the total income e¤ect coming from the educational and the nutritional grants. All household members in treatment households are subject to the income e¤ect given the (almost) unconditional nutritional grant, regardless of whether there are eligible children enrolled in and attending school in the household.
It seems reasonable to assume that all j work activities are inferior goods
and that schooling is a normal good
This would imply a negative total income term in equation (9) for the labor supply equations of any household member, and positive for the schooling demand of school aged children.
For any bene…ciary child k, the own-substitution e¤ect will go in the same direction as the income e¤ect under two further sensible assumptions: (i) schooling is an ordinary good, which
and (ii) schooling and each of the j 6 = s work activities are substitutes, which implies 9 These e¤ects might however be o¤set by nonzero cross-substitution e¤ects resulting from the reduction in the price of schooling of other bene…ciary children (likely siblings) in the household. The sign of the cross-substitution e¤ect between any two individuals will be positive or negative depending on whether schooling and work of the two individuals are substitutes or complements. Thus, the total e¤ect on schooling demand and labor supply depends on the magnitude and direction of the di¤erent e¤ects at play and remains an empirical question.
For non-bene…ciary children in treatment households, an analogous reasoning predicts an increase in schooling and a reduction in participation and hours spent in work related activities 9 The existing empirical evidence suggests that market work and schooling are substitutes (see for example,
Ravallion and Wodon 2000)
. On the contrary, farm and domestic work are more likely to involve activities compatible with schooling rather than perfect substitutes. Hence, as
on farm and domestic hours will be expected. due to the income e¤ect. The own-substitution e¤ect for these children is zero as they are not direct bene…ciaries of the educational grant. The total e¤ect of the program on their time allocation will thus depend on the sign and size of the cross-substitution e¤ects, which will in turn depend on whether schooling and work between non-bene…ciary and bene…ciary children in the household are complementary or substitute activities.
Similarly, income and cross-substitution e¤ects are likely to a¤ect the labor participation of adults in treatment households. For each activity j, a reduction in participation is expected as a result of the income e¤ect,
On the other hand, an increase in participation is expected given the reduction in the price of schooling of k:
The underlying assumption for positive cross-substitution e¤ects between adults and bene…ciary children is that their work activities are substitutes. If so, the educational grant implies an increase in the shadow value of adults'time to activities children would otherwise engage in if they were not in school. 10 Next, I turn to the description of the expected e¤ects of Oportunidades on the leisure time of household members. Replacing equation (3) in equation (9), the total e¤ect of the program on i's leisure becomes:
As before, the …rst, second and third terms identify -in this order -the own-substitution, crosssubstitution and income e¤ects. For non-bene…ciary children and for adults, i 6 = k, increases in leisure time are expected if leisure is assumed a normal good. However, the expected total program e¤ect on leisure is ambiguous as it depends on the sign of the cross-substitution e¤ects -namely, whether the leisure times of household members i and k are complements or substitutes.
1 0 Note that perfect substitutability between adults'and children's work is not required for these implications to hold. As a matter of fact, the size of the cross-substitution e¤ect -i.e., whether adults partially or fully substitute for children's time in activity j -will depend on the degree of substitutability. Because the time allocated to nonmarket activities is likely to be more elastic -this is, more of a substitute -to changes in other household member's wages than the time allocated to market work, larger cross-substitution e¤ects regarding domestic and farm work activities are expected.
For bene…ciary children, i = k, there is an added degree of uncertainty because of the nonzero own-substitution e¤ect. This e¤ect will have a positive or a negative sign depending on whether the reductions in the total number of hours working implied by the program are larger than the increases in total schooling time, or vice versa.
4 The Data
Analysis Sample and Balance
The dependent variables in this paper are constructed using information on a time use module associated to the May 1999 evaluation survey. This module contains information on the amount of time each household member older than 8 allocated to the 19 di¤erent activities -listed in Table 2 -during the day before the interview. For the purpose of analysis, these activities have been classi…ed into four di¤erent work categories -market (paid) work, farm work, domestic work and the sum of the three (all work) -schooling and leisure. 11 Leisure is de…ned as a residual (i.e. 24 hours minus total time devoted to other activities) and includes time spent sleeping, eating and socializing, which is estimated around 9 daily hours for Mexico (INEGI 2000) . 12 The sample of analysis is restricted to individuals that were not interviewed on a Sunday or a Monday. Weekday and weekend time use patters are likely to be di¤erent, specially for children in school. Basic descriptive statistics evidence that children spend less time in school and increase their participation in household chores and farm related activities over the weekend.
Similarly, adults tend to spend less time working for a wage and more time working in the house or enjoying leisure during weekends. As the main interest here is the e¤ect of the Oportunidades educational incentives on the time use of all household members, I focus on the study of weekday time use exclusively. 1 1 Other activities, such as community work and transportation, have also been considered. However, estimates (available upon request) are highly unreliable given the overall low participation rates in these activities, which is likely due to the short reference period -i.e. the day before the interview. Recall that randomized out communities were not phased in until November/December 1999. 13 It is important to clarify at this point that, treatment is de…ned as "intention to treat" rather than "actual treatment" in the current setting. This implies that all households that were o¤ered treatment are included in the sample, regardless of their …nal decision to take up the intervention. 14 Table 3 presents pre-intervention characteristics for households in the treatment and control communities in the estimation sample. The head of the household is often the man and the principal source of family income. Both he and his spouse have, on average, less than primary school completed, conditional on having some education. The average household size is six 1 3 Time use data were collected again in November 2000. By then, however, all eligible households in both treatment and control communities were receiving bene…ts. members and around 65 percent of the households have at least one child eligible to receive primary school bene…ts. The closest secondary school, an indicator of the distance to the largest locality in the area and a proxy of the availability of labor markets, is on average about 3 km far. The last column tests the di¤erence in means for pre-intervention characteristics between the treatment and control groups. Out of the 32 characteristics tested, only the number of hours the head's spouse works for a wage is statistically signi…cant -at the 10 percent level. This well-balanced sample suggests that the randomization process was e¤ective in generating truly exogenous variation in treatment, and that the two groups are comparable on observed (and unobserved) characteristics.
Time Use Allocation Before the Intervention
This subsection discusses the pre-intervention time allocation patterns of children ( Arguably, the time use of the control group in May 1999 is a good proxy of the time allocation of the treatment group before the intervention for two reasons: (i) the treatment and control groups share similar characteristics and are hence comparable, as seen in the previous subsection; and
(ii) the control group had not received bene…ts by May 1999.
A common trend in Table 4 is the negative correlation between children's schooling and work.
While school enrollment falls with age, participation in any of the work activities consideredmarket, farm or domestic work -increases. However, there are some di¤erences by gender.
Younger girls, ages 8 to 11, show higher school enrolment than boys in the same age group. But this pattern is reversed during adolescence, suggesting that girls drop out of school earlier than boys and especially during the transition from primary to junior high school (at ages 12 or 13, on average). 15 Moreover, while teenage girls -ages 14 and older -engage in household chores more than in schooling, teenage boys'participation in any type of work is higher than schooling 1 5 School attendance rates are underreported in this survey round compared to other ENCEL rounds. Parker and Skou…as (2000) point out the fact that school may have already …nished in rural isolated communities or may be close to its end at the time the time use module was carried out as a possible explanation.
only at later ages (16 and over). On average, boys' market and farm work labor supplies are higher than girls'at all ages.
The amount of time boys and girls devote to work increases with age, although some types of work are more time demanding -and hence interfere with schooling more -than others. For instance, domestic tasks require no more than one and a half hours on average for boys and between 2 and 4 hours for girls; market activities demand over 7 daily hours; and farm work takes up between 3 to 4 hours per day for boys and less than 2 hours for girls. This suggests that while domestic and farm work are compatible with schooling, participation in market work is a full time occupation.
The time use patterns for adult men and female in Table 5 re ‡ect a traditional gender division of labor in these communities. While less than 7 percent of women report working for a wage, 
where Y ih can either be leisure time of individual i in household h; participation of i in activity j; or hours i spends on activity j. The following j activities are considered: market work, farm work, domestic work and schooling (only for children). T h is a dummy that takes on the value of one if i lives in a treatment community and 0 otherwise. X ihr represents a vector of r characteristics including: current individual characteristics (age, age squared, education, ethnicity, and rank amongst siblings and parental characteristics -for children only); baseline household demographics (sex of the head, and household size and composition), baseline household assets (bathroom, electricity, land ownership and draft animal ownership); community distance to the closest municipality and state dummies. The error term " ih includes individual preferences for schooling and work and other unobservables, which are uncorrelated with the treatment status by construction. Indeed, randomization guarantees that T h ? " ih . Because Oportunidades sampled (and randomized) entire communities, I cluster standard errors at the community level.
For each activity type, equation (11) is separately estimated for boys, girls, men and women.
The leisure equation is estimated using OLS. The impact on participation in each activity j is estimated using a probit model (variation at the extensive margin). Conditional on participation changes in the amount of daily hours spent on each activity (variation at the intensive margin)
are estimated using a left-censored tobit model with censor value at zero. The mean of the observation-by-observation marginal e¤ects have been computed for the probit and tobit models as discussed in section 8.1 in the Appendix. For the tobit models, marginal e¤ects are reported for the mean of all positive outcomes -i.e. conditional on participation.
In a second set of estimates, the household treatment status is interacted with several dummies, D ihg that equal one if individual i belongs to age group g. The estimation equation becomes:
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term T h D ihg is thus an estimate of the average program impact for those individuals in age group g. I consider the following age groups for children: 8 to 11
and 12 to 17; and 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54 and more than 55 years, for adults.
Identi…cation relies on the exogeneity of the treatment status conditional on observables:
This assumption, which is guaranteed by the randomized allocation of treatment, implies that E (" ih j X ihr ; D ihg ) = 0. Randomization also implies that treatment is independent of individual characteristics, (T h ? D ihg ), and hence the treatment e¤ect for di¤erent age groups is orthogonal to the unobservables:
follows and the di¤erent b g 's are identi…ed. likely to respond to the program structure of incentives -i.e. larger transfer amounts for girls during junior high school. Note also that impacts are larger at the intensive margin, which is not too surprising considering the relatively high primary school enrollment rates.
Results on Children' s Time Use
The reduction in work hours for girls (column 5, Model IIA) -and especially amongst teenage girls (column 5, Model IIB) -is primarily driven by a reduction in the number of hours they devote to household chores (column 11, Models IIA and IIB). This …nding is of particular importance given that 60 percent of teenage girls spend, on average, more than 3 hours per day performing domestic tasks (see Table 4 ). For boys, the program reduces their time in market, farm and domestic activities, although these reductions are not statistically signi…cant. The sum of e¤ects is, however, signi…cant (column 5, Models IA and IB). Further disaggregation of the e¤ects by ages shows a dramatic reduction -of 3.3 percentage points or a 65 percent decrease! -in market work participation for boys ages 12 to 13 (results available upon request).
Figures A1 to A3 plot the distribution of the estimated observation-by-observation marginal e¤ects for those activities where the program has a larger impact: boys'schooling, girls' schooling, and girls' domestic work. For each …gure, the …rst column plots the unconditional distribution of the marginal e¤ects; the second plots marginal e¤ects by age; and the third by the number of children eligible for educational bene…ts in the household. E¤ects on participation and hours are plotted on the …rst and second rows, respectively.
As the …rst graph in Figure A1 shows, around 20 percent of boys increase attendance by the maximum value of 3.7 percentage points. On the other hand, the distribution of schooling hours follows a normal, with a majority of boys experiencing increases similar to the average increase of 0.17 hours. The distribution of e¤ects by age shows that the marginal impact on participation is higher for teenage boys (ages 12 to 17). Nonetheless, e¤ects are rather constant by number of eligible children in the household, suggesting little cross-substitution e¤ects in schooling. The plots in Figure A2 show very similar distributions of marginal e¤ects on girls'schooling.
Concerning girls' domestic work, around 25 percent of girls experience the maximum reduction of 2.1 percentage points (…rst graph in Figure A3 ). By age, the distribution of e¤ects suggests stronger and less spread e¤ects for girls 12 to 15. More children eligible for bene…ts in the household is associated with larger reductions in domestic work participation, which suggests that siblings substitute each other in the performance of household chores. 
Results on Adults'Time Use

Program Impact on Intrahousehold Time Allocation
The simple theoretical framework developed in section 3 predicts a reduction in children's participation in work activities and an increase in adults' participation in those same activities given the reduction in the price of schooling. Indeed, the estimates presented in the previous section suggest that Oportunidades has reduced teenage girls'time and participation in domestic work, and boys'participation in market work. Moreover, there is evidence of an increase in the number of hours prime-age women spend in household chores and working for a wage. Together these …ndings are indicative of potential cross-substitution e¤ects in the household, channeled through a reallocation of domestic (market) activities between mothers and daughters (sons).
This section aims to formalize this preliminary evidence. Based on equation (9), I use the randomized treatment status and household demographic structure at baseline -this is to say, the presence of eligible children in the household -to decompose the e¤ects of Oportunidades on the labor supply and schooling demand of each household member into own-substitution, cross-substitution and income e¤ects.
Identi…cation of Income and Substitution E¤ects
The reduced form proposed to disaggregate the total program impact for individual i in household h is: in equation (9) . Indeed, T h B ih = 1 if i is a child eligible to receive bene…ts (B ih = 1) and lives in a treatment household (T h = 1). As argued in section 3, for these children, the own-substitution e¤ect arises as a result of the increase in the opportunity cost of time in school that the educational grant they receive entails. Household members that are not directly entitled to the educational stipend (B ih = 0), have no own-substitution e¤ect.
Similarly, P B h is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there are children eligible to receive the educational grant in household h (other than i, if i herself is eligible for bene…ts). Arguably, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term T h P B h , b 5 , identi…es the sum of cross-substitution e¤ects given the educational stipends that (other) eligible children living in the household receive -i.e. P k6 =i
in equation (9) . As seen, cross-substitution e¤ects may alter the time allocation patterns of individuals living in treatment households (T h = 1) where there are children directly bene…ting from the educational stipends (P B h = 1). 17 In this setting, the coe¢ cient on the treatment variable, b 1 , identi…es the (residual) income e¤ect. In treatment households with no children eligible to receive the educational grant, both B ih = 0 and P B h = 0, and the total program impact equals the income e¤ect coming from the nutritional grant. However, in households with children eligible to receive the educational grant, the income e¤ect is the remaining impact of the program, once the e¤ect of all educational grants has been accounted for.
As noted, identi…cation strongly relies on both the randomization of the treatment status and the use of pre-intervention data to construct the regressors of interest. The variables B ih
and P B h re ‡ect children eligible for bene…ts -i.e. potentially bene…ciary children -rather than children e¤ectively receiving bene…ts -i.e. actual bene…ciaries -in order to correct for the endogeneity linked to being a bene…ciary. Recall that eligible children receive the educational grant conditional on attending school, which implies that being an actual bene…ciary re ‡ects in part the decision of going to school. I determine potentially bene…ciary children in May 1999 taking the grade the child is enrolled in at baseline and moving it forward assuming no repetition or dropout. The number of potential bene…ciaries is thus an overestimate of the number of actual bene…ciaries. Moreover, because treatment status is independent of baseline characteristics and school enrollment, T h ? " ih p (X ihr ; B ih ; P B h ) and so T h B ih ? " ih p (X ihr ; B ih ; P B h ) and
Besides the control variables in X ihr de…ned above, the speci…cation in (13) additionally controls for the gender and the potential grade of the …rst four bene…ciary children (excluding i if i is a bene…ciary child). These variables induce variation in the amount of transfers treatment households receive. 18 In order to obtain an estimate of the income e¤ect across households receiving the same monetary incentive, I also include the log of the potential total transfer amount a household would receive in May 1999 as a regressor. As for potential children, this amount is computed taking household composition at baseline and applying the program bene…t allocation rules assuming no school dropout, no grade repetition and universal enrollment. Finally, note that equation (9) implies an additional assumption to identify the income e¤ect: eligible children in households receiving the same transfer amount ( P k dW s k + dY ) must have similar time use patterns -i.e. supply the same number of hours to activity j, Tables 8 and 9 report coe¢ cient estimates of the income, own-substitution and cross-substitution e¤ects resulting from the estimation of (13) for boys, girls, adult men and adult women.
Results on Intrahousehold Time Allocation
For boys and girls, the estimation sample has been restricted to teenagers (children ages 12 to 17) since, as seen in section 5.2, it is within this age group that larger program impacts on time allocation are observed. As expected, results show a positive and signi…cant own-substitution e¤ect on participation and hours in school for boys (second and third columns in Table 8 , Panel I). Moreover, the presence of other bene…ciary siblings signi…cantly reduces the amount of time they devote to school related activities (negative cross-substitution e¤ects). This suggests that these households continue to face the so-called quantity/quality trade o¤ in educational choices, even after extra resources are poured into the household. For girls, the own-substitution and cross-substitution e¤ects go in the same direction as for boys but are not statistically signi…cant.
Consistent with the theory, there is strong evidence of a negative own-substitution e¤ect (5.9 percentage points reduction) on market work participation for bene…ciary teenage boys.
For girls, there is weak evidence -signi…cant at the 10 percent -of a negative cross-substitution e¤ect on market work hours. The income and own-substitution e¤ects are, however, very imprecisely estimated and not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Estimates also suggest a 14.8
percentage point reduction in farm work participation for teenage girls through an income effect. Nonetheless, conditional on participation, the number of hours teenage girls devote to farm activities increases with the number of (other) eligible children in treatment households.
In other words, (older) teenage girls in treatment households spend more time performing farm related tasks to substitute for the time previously devoted by (other) bene…ciary children in the household. Finally, own-substitution e¤ects result in a strong reduction in girls'leisure, which is larger than the increase given the income e¤ect. This is in line with the overall reduction in leisure time for teenage girls reported in Table 6 . The e¤ects on leisure for teenage boys are qualitatively similar but not statistically signi…cant.
Results in Table 9 show a common pattern regarding the e¤ects of Oportunidades on women's time allocated to the di¤erent work activities (with the exception of market work). On the one hand, the negative income e¤ects imply lower adult female participation and less hours devoted to farm and domestic activities, and to overall work. On the other hand, the positive crosssubstitution e¤ects suggest that adult female increase their participation and time in these activities so as to substitute for the work that eligible children in the household were performing before the intervention. These …ndings -in line with the evidence in sections 5.2 and 5.3 -support the theoretically predicted positive intrahousehold interactions between adult women and eligible teenagers to free up their time from domestic and farm tasks to go to school.
Not surprisingly, while the income e¤ect results in a positive and signi…cant increase of leisure for adult women in the household, the cross-substitution e¤ect implies a reduction in their leisure time. The total impact -reported in Table 7 -is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Indeed, further disaggregating the results by age (results available upon request) shows that for prime age women 25 to 44, the income and substitution e¤ects cancel each other out.
For men, however, the positive income e¤ect is larger in size than the negative cross-substitution e¤ect (column 1, Table 9 ), resulting in the almost signi…cant -signi…cant at the 10 percentoverall increase in men's leisure time reported in Table 7 . These …ndings suggest that women receive the burden of labor responsibility due to the program, while men do not substitute for their children's time to the same extent and increase leisure time instead. 19 The This paper shows that this remains true even when nonremunerated activities are included in the de…nition of work. More generally, conditional cash transfer programs appear as a potentially useful tool to reduce child labor in its various forms. Moreover, the ‡exibility in their design make them particularly attractive to address speci…c (context-dependent) problems. As shown above, the particular structure of incentives of the program -increasing transfers as the child enrolls in higher grades and o¤ering larger transfers to girls -seems to operate in the desired direction. Indeed, children older than 12 -in general -and girls -in particular -are the demographic groups with larger impacts on time allocation.
The second part of the paper investigates the transmission channels of these e¤ects. The randomized allocation of treatment and the program structure of incentives are exploited to disaggregate the total program impact on individual time use into income, own-substitution and cross-substitution e¤ects. Reduced form estimates suggested that there are positive crosssubstitution e¤ects between adult women and children concerning the two forms of unpaid work considered: farm work and domestic work. This suggests that rather than promoting disincentives to adult female labor supply and create welfare dependency, conditional cash transfer programs may indeed generate positive responses amongst adult household members -in particular women -to facilitate the investment in human capital of younger members.
Appendix
Computation of Marginal E¤ects
For probit models the estimated e¤ect of switching the j-th binary variable, x j , from 0 to 1 on the probability that y i equals one is:
where x 1 i is the vector of regressors with the j-th binary variable set to 1, and similarly for x 0 i . (:) and (:) are the density and cumulative distribution functions of a standard normal. If x j is a continuous variable, the e¤ect is:
For the tobit model, the estimated e¤ect of a binary variable on the mean of all positive y i 's,
i.e. conditional on participation is:
where
^ . If x j is a continuous variable, the e¤ect on the mean of all positive y i 's becomes:
For each observation i, the M P ij and M T ij depend on the values of all coe¢ cients and regressors j. Mean observation-by-observation marginal e¤ects are computed by evaluating the marginal e¤ect of variable j for each observation and taking the mean over the sample of these marginal e¤ects: 20
The variance-covariance matrix of the observation-by-observation marginal e¤ects is calculated using the Delta Method, in order to account for the existing covariance between the estimated marginal e¤ects of any two observations. Given the gradient is a linear map, the gradient of the mean marginal e¤ect is the mean of the observation-by-observation gradients. Thus, the variance-covariance matrix is calculated as:
where V (^ ) is the chosen covariance matrix for^ . 
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Notes: +significant at 10%. †Conditional on being positive. T-stat of differences in means computed clustering SE at the community level. Mean of dichotomous variables expressed in percentages. Notes: +Significant at the 10 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. SE clustered at the community level in parantheses. For probit and tobit models, mean of the observation-by-observation marginal effects reported. All regressions include the following controls: age, age squared, education dummies, rank amongst siblings, mother's ethnicity, sex of the household's head, baseline household demographics and household size, baseline dwelling characteristics (bathroom, electricity, land ownership and draft animal ownership), log male's agricultural wage (in 1997 prices), distance to the closest municipality and state dummies. Age and age squared are not included in Models B.
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Farm Work Domestic Work Table 7 Notes: +Significant at the 10 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level. SE clustered at the community level in parantheses. For probit and tobit models, mean of the observation-by-observation marginal effects reported. All regressions include the following controls: age, age squared, education dummies, marital status, head of the household status, ethnicity, baseline household demographics and household size, baseline dwelling characteristics (bathroom, electricity, land ownership and draft animal ownership), log male agricultural wage (in 1997 prices), distance to the closest municipality and state dummies. Age and age squared are not included in Models B.
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Farm Work Domestic Work Table 8 Notes: +Significant at the 10 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. SE clustered at the community level in parantheses. For probit and tobit models, mean observation-by-observation marginal effects reported. All regressions include the following controls: age, age squared, education dummies, rank amongst siblings, mother's ethnicity, sex of the household's head, baseline household demographics and household size, baseline dwelling characteristics (bathroom, electricity, land ownership and draft animal ownership), sex and grade of the first four beneficiary children in the household, log of the total potential household transfer amount (in 1997 prices), log male's agricultural wage (in 1997 prices), distance to the closest municipality and state dummies.
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Farm Work Domestic Work Table 9 Notes: +Significant at the 10 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. SE clustered at the community level in parantheses. For probit and tobit models, mean of the observation-by-observation marginal effects reported. All regressions include the following controls: age, age squared, education dummies, marital status, household head status, ethnicity, baseline household demographics and household size, baseline dwelling characteristics (bathroom, electricity, land ownership and draft animal ownership), sex and grade of the first four beneficiary children in the household, log of the total potential household transfer amount (in 1997 prices), log male agricultural wage (in 1997 prices), distance to the closest municipality and state dummies. Age and age squared are not included in Models B.
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